From this study the true role of this universal association emerges little by little, and it may be briefly stated thus : Freemasonry is a body of superimposed secret societies spread throughout the world. Its aim is to destroy the present civilization based on Christian principles, to establish in its place an atheistic rationalist society which, in fact, leads straight to materialism although it is supposed to have science and reason as a religion. Appearances have often changed but this aim has remained unalterable. The inner nature of the struggle is spiritual. It is a conflict between rationalism and the Christian idea, between the rights of God and the rights of man, who will become a man-god, directed by a state-god. In order to reach this final aim it was necessary to begin by undertaking the overthrow of monarchies representing the principles of authority and tradition, and to replace them, little by little, by the universal atheist masonic republic.
The advantage of Mind War is that it conducts wars in nonlethal, non-injurious, and non-destructive ways. Essentially you overwhelm your enemy with argument. You seize control of all of the means by which his government and populace process information to make up their minds, and you adjust it so that those minds are made up as you desire. Everyone is happy, no one gets hurt or killed, and nothing is destroyed.
Ordinary warfare, on the other hand, is characterized by its lack of reason. The antagonists just maim or kill each other’s people, and steal or destroy each other’s land, until one side is hurt so badly that it gives up [or both sides are hurt so badly that they agree to stop short of victory]. After such a war there is lasting misery, hate, and suffering.
The only loser in Mind War are the war profiteers: companies and corporations which grow fat on orders for helicopters, tanks, guns, munitions, etc. Consequently what President Dwight Eisenhower referred to as the “military/industrial complex” can be counted upon to resist implementation of Mind War as the governing strategic conflict doctrine.
That’s the Mind War prospectus in its most simplified form.
Words of former United Nations climate official Ottmar Edenhofer:
“One has to free oneself from the illusion that international climate policy is environmental policy. This has almost nothing to do with the environmental policy anymore, with problems such as deforestation or the ozone hole,” said Edenhofer, who co-chaired the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change working group on Mitigation of Climate Change from 2008 to 2015.
So what is the goal of environmental policy?
“We redistribute de facto the world’s wealth by climate policy,” said Edenhofer.
To the dispassionate observer who happens to possess a memory, nothing is more extraordinary than the paroxysm of fury and suspicion with regard to Germany’s intentions which broke out last spring in our country where — until five years ago — pro-Germanism was de rigueur in “intellectual” and so-called “advanced” circles. This kind of pro-Germanism was of long standing. It was seen after the Franco-Prussian War when The Times of 18 November, 1870, gave prominence to Carlyle’s letter deploring the “cheap pity and newspaper lamentation over fallen and afflicted France” and ending with the fervent hope that “noble, patient, deep, pious and solid Germany should be at length wielded into a nation and become Queen of the Continent.”
Before the Great War [WWI] when the hostile intentions of Germany toward the British Empire were clearly evident; when German officers were drinking to “der Tag,” [the Day] whilst German writers openly committed their plans for world power to paper and incident after incident showed that war was inevitable, all those who warned our country were derided or insulted. It was even suggested that Lord Roberts should be deprived of his pension for conducting his campaign for National Service.
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2nd ed.) is a current (published 2015) encyclopedic collection of four to eight page scholarly articles on topics in all areas of the social sciences: anthropology, archaeology, behavioral neuroscience, clinical psychology, cognitive neuroscience and psychology, demography, economics, education, geography, history, labor studies, law, linguistics, political science, sociology and more. Included are biographies of hundreds of significant figues in these fields, from the 19th century to the present. Articles may be browsed by subject classification, title or subject index, or searched by keyword.
Internment/resettlement specialists are primarily responsible for day-to-day operations in a military confinement/correctional facility or detention/internment facility.
- Supervision of confinement and detention operations
- External security to facilities
- Counseling/guidance to individual prisoners within a rehabilitative program
- Records of prisoners/internees and their programs
Those who want to serve must first take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, a series of tests that helps you better understand your strengths and identify which Army jobs are best for you.
Job training for an internment/resettlement specialist requires 10 weeks of Basic Combat Training and seven weeks of Advanced Individual Training with on-the-job instruction. Part of this time is spent in the classroom and in the field.
Some of the skills you’ll learn are:
- Military laws and jurisdictions
- Self-defense and use of firearms
- Interpersonal communications skills
- Search/restraint and custody/control procedures
- Interest in law enforcement
- Physically and mentally fit
- Ability to make quick decisions
- Remain calm under heavy duress
Very little historical research has been conducted on the use of swarming. This work seeks to address this deficiency by analyzing twenty three case studies of past swarming in order to derive a framework for understanding swarm outcomes. The conclusions of this historical analysis are then applied to a discussion of future swarming by both friendly and enemy forces.
This dissertation should be of interest to both military historians and analysts in the defense community concerned with understanding the potential of swarming for future rapid reaction forces and enemy ground forces. The results of the study highlight the limitations and constraints of swarming for both future friendly forces and for current insurgent swarms today (indeed, while this work is primarily theoretical and broad-based, it might be considered sensitive material in so far as it could be put to use by our enemies). The methods used to arrive at those results highlight how qualitative techniques can be used across many complex historical case studies.
This research was supported by RAND’s Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United Stated Army; the International Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a FFRDC sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified commands, and the defense agencies; the Strategy and Doctrine Program in RAND’s Project AIR FORCE, a FFRDC sponsored by the United States Air Force; and finally, the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2.
The principal object of management should be to secure the maximum prosperity for the employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity for each employee. The words “maximum prosperity” are used, in their broad sense, to mean not only large dividends for the company or owner, but the development of every branch of the business to its highest state of excellence, so that the prosperity may be permanent. In the same way maximum prosperity for each employee means not only higher wages than are usually received by men of his class, but, of more importance still, it also means the development of each man to his state of maximum efficiency, so that he may be able to do, generally speaking, the highest grade of work for which his natural abilities fit him, and it further means giving him, when possible, this class of work to do.
It would seem to be so self-evident that maximum prosperity for the employer, coupled with maximum prosperity for the employee, ought to be the two leading objects of management, that even to state this fact should be unnecessary. And yet there is no question that, throughout the industrial world, a large part of the organization of employers, as well as employees, is for war rather than for peace, and that perhaps the majority on either side do not believe that it is possible so to arrange their mutual relations that their interests become identical.
The majority of these men believe that the fundamental interests of employees and employers are necessarily antagonistic. Scientific management, on the contrary, has for its very foundation the firm conviction that the true interests of the two are one and the same; that prosperity for the employer cannot exist through a long term of years unless it is accompanied by prosperity for the employee, and vice versa; and that it is possible to give the workman what he most wants—high wages—and the employer what he wants—a low labor cost—for his manufactures.
The United States is currently engaged in what has been characterized as the “long war.” The long war has been described by some as an epic struggle against adversaries bent on forming a unified Islamic world to supplant Western dominance, while others characterize it more narrowly as an extension of the war on terror. But while policymakers, military leaders, and scholars have offered numerous definitions of the long war, no consensus has been reached about this term or its implications for the United States. To understand the effects that this long war will have on the U.S. Army and on U.S. forces in general, it is necessary to understand more precisely what the long war is and how it might unfold. To address this need, this study explores the concept of the long war and identifies potential ways in which it might unfold as well as the implications for the Army and the U.S. military more generally.
Divide and Rule
Divide and Rule focuses on exploiting fault lines between the various Salafi-jihadist groups to turn them against each other and dissipate their energy on internal conflicts. This strategy relies heavily on covert action, information operations (IO), unconventional warfare, and support to indigenous security forces. Divide and Rule would be the obvious strategy choice for the “Narrowing of Threat” trajectory as the United States and its local allies could use the nationalist jihadists to launch proxy IO campaigns to discredit the transnational jihadists in the eyes of the local populace. In the “Holding Action” trajectory, Divide and Rule would be an inexpensive way of buying time for the United States and its allies until the United States can return its full attention to the long war. U.S. leaders could also choose to capitalize on the “Sustained Shia-Sunni Conflict” trajectory by taking the side of the conservative Sunni regimes against Shiite empowerment movements in the Muslim world.
Beyond the most basic definition as ‘the study of signs’, there is considerable variation among leading semioticians as to what semiotics involves. One of the broadest definitions is that of Umberto Eco, who states that ‘semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign’ (Eco 1976, 7). Semiotics involves the study not only of what we refer to as ‘signs’ in everyday speech, but of anything which ‘stands for’ something else. In a semiotic sense, signs take the form of words, images, sounds, gestures and objects. Contemporary semioticians study signs not in isolation but as part of semiotic ‘sign-systems’ (such as a medium or genre). They study how meanings are made and how reality is represented.
Theories of signs (or ‘symbols’) appear throughout the history of philosophy from ancient times onwards (see Todorov 1982), the first explicit reference to semiotics as a branch of philosophy appearing in John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). However, the two primary traditions in contemporary semiotics stem respectively from the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced ‘purse’) (1839–1914). Saussure’s term sémiologie dates from a manuscript of 1894. The first edition of his Course in General Linguistics, published posthumously in 1916, contains the declaration that:
It is . . . possible to conceive of a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life. It would form part of social psychology, and hence of general psychology. We shall call it semiology (from the Greek se¯meîon, ‘sign’). It would investigate the nature of signs and the laws governing them. Since it does not yet exist, one cannot say for certain that it will exist. But it has a right to exist, a place ready for it in advance. Linguistics is only one branch of this general science. The laws which semiology will discover will be laws applicable in linguistics, and linguistics will thus be assigned to a clearly defined place in the field of human knowledge.
(Saussure 1983, 15–16)