At the conclusion of the Cold War, military planners in the U.S. made the assumption that a military organized, trained, and equipped to fight a near-peer competitor would be able to handle any type of conflict, which would, after all, be considered a subset to a Major Theater War (Barnett, Mar 2004). The pattern that has emerged since the end of the Cold War, however, is not one of conflict with powerful industrialized nations; rather the U.S. has been engaged in locations that were considered to be no immediate threat to national survival, the Third World. It is the Third World that has spawned the “gravest threat we face”, the threat from trans-national terrorism (Barnett, Mar 2004). U.S. military operations since the end of the Cold War also suggest, 1-1 by their mixed results, that the U.S. military is not fully prepared to handle the threats from trans-national, clandestine terror organizations. This fact was most emphatically highlighted on Sept. 11, 2001 (Barnett, Mar 2004).