The Drug War

US-NATO Military Protecting Poppy Fields in Afghanistan
US-NATO Military Protecting Poppy Fields in Afghanistan

The cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan—a nation under the military control of US and NATO forces for more than twelve years—has risen to an all-time high, according to the 2013 Afghanistan Opium Survey released Wednesday by the United Nations. According to the report, cultivation of poppy across the war-torn nation rose 36 per cent in 2013 and total opium production amounted to 5,500 tons, up by almost a half since 2012. “This has never been witnessed before in the history of Afghanistan,” said Jean-Luc Lemahieu, the outgoing leader of the Afghanistan office of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which produced the report.

Dark Alliance

The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia

How a Big US bank Laundered Billions from Mexico’s Murderous Drug Gangs

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018

World Drug Report Conclusions and Policy Implications

Global Overview of Drug Demand and Supply

Analysis of Drug Markets

Drugs and Age

Women and Drugs

The Global Afghan Opium Trade

Afghan Opium Trade

Afghanistan Northern Route

Afghan Opiate Trafficking Southern Route

Opiate Trafficking and Trade Agreements

Handbook Stamps and Other Markings Heroin Bags

Illicit DT Through See Report

Afghan Opiate Trade Africa

Impacts of Drugs Study



Collapse of Third World into Babylon

1970s Weatherman Underground
1970s Weatherman Underground

The Weathermen turned to violence largely in opposition to the Vietnam War and out of their desire to help militant blacks like the Black Panthers. These commitments lent an immediacy to their violence, irrespective of the group’s larger revolutionary ambitions. With its bombings of military and police targets, Weatherman was able to provide at least moral and political censure of the war in Vietnam and the state’s assaults on people of color in the United States. The group, in short, could moderate its approach to, and eventually withdraw from, violence with some sense of accomplishment. Former members typically concede that violence failed miserably as a revolutionary tactic but defend its integrity and limited utility as a response to the Vietnam War and to institutional racism. Issues of identity contributed to the group’s restraint in another sense.

Weatherman’s desire to match the sacrifices of blacks and Vietnamese fueled the group’s initial belief in the singular value of violence. Weatherman’s violence, in this aspect, was a volatile and often vexed effort of members of the white middle class to confront and somehow renounce their structural privilege. In the mid 1970s, the Weathermen broadened their conception of revolutionary politics and reassessed what kind of practice would be most beneficial, given their backgrounds. Chiefly, they recognized the need to organize other whites, for which nonlethal violence and the distribution of conventional propaganda was a more promising approach than a literal guerrilla war. By the time the group asserted the need to build a mass movement, it was far too small and too isolated to play a leading role on the left. Nonetheless, by revising their sense of mission, the Weathermen avoided mistaking themselves for the causes they meant to serve.

The Weatherman Underground Red Army

Army Civil Disturb Plan Garden Plot 1968

Army Civil Disturb Plan Garden Plot 1978

Army Civil Disturb Plan Garden Plot 1991

HR 645