This paper examines the political categories of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’, in particular as they are evoked and instrumentalised by political actors in the democratic process. Drawing on some of the insights of positioning theory, it shows how ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ are discursive resources deployed, contested and resisted in political exchange. The paper looks in depth at some of the political uses to which Left-Right talk may be put, discussing in particular acts of partisan profiling, of legitimisation and subversion, and the evocation or rejection of political continuity. The paper argues that while these usages can be seen as strategic moves pursued for political advantage, they have a larger significance insofar as they indicate one of the ways the democratically important imagery of Left and Right may remain active in European politics.
RAND developed the Delphi method in the 1950s, originally to forecast the impact of technology on warfare. The method entails a group of experts who anonymously reply to questionnaires and subsequently receive feedback in the form of a statistical representation of the “group response,” after which the process repeats itself. The goal is to reduce the range of responses and arrive at something closer to expert consensus. The Delphi Method has been widely adopted and is still in use today.
From the 1920s on wards, the question of Hegelian philosophy’s vital influence on Marx as well as to contemporary Marxism was instead investigated with a greater intensity by a number of theorists in, above all, central Europe. One of the basic assumptions of this book is that there are reasons to regard and treat these quite diverse thinkers as Hegelian Marxists. The Hungarian philosopher and aestheticist Georg Lukács and the German theoretician Karl Korsch were pioneers in reexamining the relation between
Hegel and Marx.
From a variety of perspectives the present anthology addresses the theme of Hegelian Marxism. More specifically, it deals with how some Marxist thinkers, in different historical, political and intellectual contexts during the last century, have employed Hegel’s philosophy with the aim of developing and renewing Marxist theory. The principal focus is on a series of well known theorists from Central and Eastern Europe. Besides Lukács and Korsch—and to some extent also Lenin—the articles included in this volume deal mainly with the thoughts of Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Evald Ilyenkov and Slavoj Žižek; one text goes beyond the geographical focus of Central and Eastern Europe by highlighting the Italian philosopher Lucio Colletti, who was nonetheless critically engaged in exploring the extent of a (dis)connection between Hegel and Marx.
The overall purpose of the book is to investigate if and to what extent these thinkers could be interpreted as Hegelian Marxists, and how they use the Hegelian philosophy with the intention to better understand their own current society as well as situate themselves in relation to orthodox forms of Marxism. Another purpose is to illuminate, from the perspective of intellectual history, how Hegelian Marxism has served as a significant politico-philosophical tradition, with its beginnings in the early twentieth century and reaching up to, and including, today.
What Mr. Rothschild had discovered was the basic principle of power, influence, and control over people as applied to economics. That principle is “when you assume the appearance of power, people soon give it to you.”
Mr. Rothschild had discovered that currency or deposit loan accounts had the required appearance of power that could be used to induce people (inductance, with people corresponding to a magnetic field) into surrendering their real wealth in exchange for a promise of greater wealth (instead of real compensation). They would put up real collateral in exchange for a loan of promissory notes. Mr. Rothschild found that he could issue more notes than he had backing for, so long as he had someone’s stock of gold as a persuader to show his customers.
Mr. Rothschild loaned his promissory notes to individuals and to governments. These would create overconfidence. Then he would make money scarce, tighten control of the system, and collect the collateral through the obligation of contracts. The cycle was then repeated. These pressures could be used to ignite a war. Then he would control the availability of currency to determine who would win the war. That government which agreed to give him control of its economic system got his support.
Collection of debts was guaranteed by economic aid to the enemy of the debtor. The profit derived from this economic methodology made Mr. Rothschild all the more able to expand his wealth. He found that the public greed would allow currency to be printed by government order beyond the limits (inflation) of backing in precious metal or the production of goods and services.