The purpose of this book is to explore key emergent information technology developments for managing conflict, waging war and creating dysfunction within modern societies which are dependent on continuous information flows. It considers how the challenge is being addressed and assesses the longer-term implications and risks of these new approaches to conflict management and control. It is essentially composed of four substantive parts. Part I seeks to define the issues. Part II explores the implications of the problem and Part III presents some different (non-western) country perspectives. Finally, Part IV questions what is being done and must be done if we are to avoid being overwhelmed by competing and contradictory paradigms. The conclusion takes a tentative glimpse at innovations on the horizon and the social and political implications and ramifications.
Cyberwar, Information Warfare (IW), Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) are terms that have been widely used by military observers for over a decade. In the early 1990s, in the immediate past-Cold War World, researchers such as Ronfeldt and Arquilla. 1who worked for the Rand Corporation, gave an account of what they saw as a new ‘high-tech’ model of warfare. The theory created by them had already gained credibility within the US military establishment by 1995, 2 though recent writers have claimed that the theoretical arguments are flawed and incomplete. 3 Much of the early discussion was either devoted to the threat to society posed by freelance hackers, or investigated broader theoretical possibilities. Similarly, the debate on the RMA was essentially a speculation in futuristic possibilities which did not yet have a public budget line attached. All that has now changed.
ONE TRAGEDY of the human condition is that each of us lives and dies with little hint of even the most profound transformations of our society and our species that play themselves out in some small part through our own existence. When the earliest Homo sapiens encountered Homoerectus, or whatever species was our immediate forebear, it is unlikely that the two saw in their differences a major turning point in the development of our race. If they did, this knowledge did not survive to be recorded, at least not in the ancient writings now extant. Indeed, some fifty thousand years passed before Darwin and Wallace rediscovered the secret-proof of the difficulty of grasping even the most essential dynamics of our lives and our society.
A small band of “RMA” analysts has emerged in the military and Department of Defense, in the academic strategic studies community, and in defense-related think-tanks and consulting firms. To these analysts, the Gulf War provided a vision of a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) in which Information Age technology would be combined with appropriate doctrine and training to allow a small but very advanced U.S. military to protect national interests with unprecedented efficiency. The authors examine the open-source literature on the RMA that has resulted. They find that much of it has concentrated on defining and describing military revolutions and that, despite the efforts of some of the finest minds in the defense analytical community, it has not offered either comprehensive basic theories or broad policy choices and implications. The authors believe that in order to master a RMA rather than be dragged along by it, Americans must debate its theoretical underpinnings, strategic implications, core assumptions, and normative choices. As a step in that direction they provide a set of hypotheses regarding the configuration and process of revolutions in military affairs, and examine some of their potential policy implications.
The purported Asianism of the late nineteenth century must therefore be taken with a pinch of salt; .before Eurasianism in. the 1920s, no Russian intellectual movement displayed areal openness.to the Turko-Mongol world. Asia was only ever highlighted under the aspect of Aryanism; it was a mere detour to reinforced claims of Eutopeanness. Most of those theorists who sought to comment on Russia’s alleged distinctiveness, from the Slavophile Aleksandr Khomiakov in 1840 to the Symbolist poet Aleksandr Blok iQ 1918, painted Russia’s identity in identical terms, embodied by Scythia; for them, the Russians were descended directly from the Asian cradle of the European peoples. Even the best-known Pan-Slavists, such as Nikolai Danilevsky ( 1822-85), claimed to prefer Asia over the “Romano-Germanic” world, Islam or Buddhism over Catholicism, and the Turks over the Latins. The idea was that it was Europe’s errors and lack of understanding, the European allegation that the Slavs were “Turanian,”9 that forced the Russians to take this “slanted-eyed” view of Russia, in Aleksandr Blok’s poetic phrase. 10 Thus it took the shock of the Revolution of 1917 and exile to really prepare the ground for Eurasianism’s claims of Asianness.
In order to achieve mastery and control over the thoughts and behaviors of another human being, a particular technique or tool comes in handy, especially if it serves to completely alter the existing personality and replace it with the desired personality. Mind control techniques can be subtle, and imperceptible to the one being controlled, but in many cases, the covert manipulation is done in a much more obvious, even ominous, manner. Psychologist and author George K. Simon (In Sheep’s Clothing: Understanding and Dealing With Manipulative People) wrote that to successfully manipulate another human being, a controller or abuser would have to 1) conceal his aggressive agenda and intentions; 2) know the psychological vulnerabilities of the intended victim, and modify the tactics accordingly; 3) be ruthless enough to not care if the victim is harmed; and 4) use covert aggression in the form of relational or passive aggressive tactics. Knowing the weakness of the victim is paramount to achieving control, and many mind controllers have a sharp and keen eye for seeing those weaknesses early on and taking full advantage of them via a variety of means.
The Jew is again being singled out for critical attention throughout the world. His emergence in the financial, political and social spheres has been so complete and spectacular since the war, that his place, power and purpose in the world are being given a new scrutiny, much of it unfriendly. Persecution is not a new experience to the Jew, but intensive scrutiny of his nature and super-nationality is. He has suffered for more than 2,000 years from what may be called instinctive anti-Semitism of the other races, but this antagonism has never been intelligent nor has it been able to make itself intelligible. Nowadays, however, the Jew is being placed, as it were, under the microscope of economic observation that the reasons for his power, the reasons for his separateness, the reasons for his suffering may be defined and understood.
In Russia he is charged with being the source of Bolshevism, an accusation which is serious or not according to the circle in which it is made; we in America, hearing the fervid eloquence and perceiving the prophetic ardor of young Jewish apostles of social and industrial reform, can calmly estimate how it may be. In Germany he is charged with being the cause of the Empire’s collapse and a very considerable literature has sprung up, bearing with it a mass of circumstantial evidence that gives the thinker pause. In England he is charged with being the real world ruler, who rules as a super-nation over the nations, rules by the power of gold, and who plays nation against nation for his own purposes, remaining himself discreetly in the background. In America it is pointed out to what extent the elder Jews of wealth and the younger Jews of ambition swarmed through the war organizations — principally those departments which dealt with the commercial and industrial business of war, and also the extent to which they have clung to the advantage which their experience as agents of the government gave them.